hey desire
philosophical proofs and demonstrations, I refer them to Niphus, Nic.
Faventinus' tracts of this subject. To Fran. and John Picus _in digress:
sup. 3. de Anima_, Tholosanus, Eugubinus, To. Soto, Canas, Thomas,
Peresius, Dandinus, Colerus, to that elaborate tract in Zanchius, to
Tolet's Sixty Reasons, and Lessius' Twenty-two Arguments, to prove the
immortality of the soul. Campanella, _lib. de sensu rerum_, is large in the
same discourse, Albertinus the Schoolman, Jacob. Nactantus, _tom. 2. op._
handleth it in four questions, Antony Brunus, Aonius Palearius, Marinus
Marcennus, with many others. This reasonable soul, which Austin calls a
spiritual substance moving itself, is defined by philosophers to be "the
first substantial act of a natural, humane, organical body, by which a man
lives, perceives, and understands, freely doing all things, and with
election." Out of which definition we may gather, that this rational soul
includes the powers, and performs the duties of the two other, which are
contained in it, and all three faculties make one soul, which is
inorganical of itself, although it be in all parts, and incorporeal, using
their organs, and working by them. It is divided into two chief parts,
differing in office only, not in essence. The understanding, which is the
rational power apprehending; the will, which is the rational power moving:
to which two, all the other rational powers are subject and reduced.

SUBSECT. X.--_Of the Understanding_.

"Understanding is a power of the soul, [1011]by which we perceive, know,
remember, and judge as well singulars, as universals, having certain innate
notices or beginnings of arts, a reflecting action, by which it judgeth of
his own doings, and examines them." Out of this definition (besides his
chief office, which is to apprehend, judge all that he performs, without
the help of any instruments or organs) three differences appear betwixt a
man and a beast. As first, the sense only comprehends singularities, the
understanding universalities. Secondly, the sense hath no innate notions.
Thirdly, brutes cannot reflect upon themselves. Bees indeed make neat and
curious works, and many other creatures besides; but when they have done,
they cannot judge of them. His object is God, _ens_, all nature, and
whatsoever is to be understood: which successively it apprehends. The
object first moving the understanding, is some sensible thing; after by
discoursing, the mind fin