ather in the
understanding than in the will. This makes the major proposition in a
practical syllogism. The _dictamen rationis_ is that which doth admonish us
to do good or evil, and is the minor in the syllogism. The conscience is
that which approves good or evil, justifying or condemning our actions, and
is the conclusion of the syllogism: as in that familiar example of Regulus
the Roman, taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, and suffered to go to Rome,
on that condition he should return again, or pay so much for his ransom.
The synteresis proposeth the question; his word, oath, promise, is to be
religiously kept, although to his enemy, and that by the law of nature.
[1014]"Do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself."
Dictamen applies it to him, and dictates this or the like: Regulus, thou
wouldst not another man should falsify his oath, or break promise with
thee: conscience concludes, therefore, Regulus, thou dost well to perform
thy promise, and oughtest to keep thine oath. More of this in Religious
Melancholy.

SUBSECT. XI.--_Of the Will_.

Will is the other power of the rational soul, [1015]"which covets or avoids
such things as have been before judged and apprehended by the
understanding." If good, it approves; if evil, it abhors it: so that his
object is either good or evil. Aristotle calls this our rational appetite;
for as, in the sensitive, we are moved to good or bad by our appetite,
ruled and directed by sense; so in this we are carried by reason. Besides,
the sensitive appetite hath a particular object, good or bad; this an
universal, immaterial: that respects only things delectable and pleasant;
this honest. Again, they differ in liberty. The sensual appetite seeing an
object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evil, avoid
it: but this is free in his essence, [1016]"much now depraved, obscured,
and fallen from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still
free," as to go, walk, move at his pleasure, and to choose whether it will
do or not do, steal or not steal. Otherwise, in vain were laws,
deliberations, exhortations, counsels, precepts, rewards, promises, threats
and punishments: and God should be the author of sin. But in [1017]
spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be regenerate,
and led by the Spirit), we are egged on by our natural concupiscence, and
there is [Greek: ataxia], a confusion in our powers, [1018]"our whole wil