ue, and the provincials
were stubborn foes whose true measure Burgoyne had not yet taken,[84]
but he saw how poorly Gage had provided against the calamities which had
come upon him. Burgoyne doubted the outcome, and fretted at the
situation.

In the meanwhile the rebels had been working to make that situation
worse. Their first need was to get some semblance of order among the
troops. At the head of the Massachusetts army was Artemas Ward, a
veteran of the French wars, no longer vigorous, and never used to
independent command. He drew his authority from the Provincial Congress
of Massachusetts, which now hastily came together, and communicated with
Ward chiefly through the Committee of Safety, of one of whose meetings
we have already had a glimpse. The active head of the committee was
Warren, who kept in close touch with Ward.

Organization proceeded slowly, complicated by the fact that the other
provinces maintained separate armies. The names of some of the
commanders are still familiar. Putnam and Spencer were the heads of the
Connecticut troops; John Stark was prominent among the New Hampshire
men; while to command the Rhode Islanders came Nathanael Greene. With
praiseworthy suppression of provincial jealousies the commanders
speedily agreed to subordinate themselves to Ward, as the oldest among
them, and the head of the largest body of troops. He was regarded as
commander-in-chief, and his orders were to be observed by all. Yet the
means to communicate orders and to receive reports were long lacking.
The combined armies were far from being a unit, and if attacked could
resist little better than on the 19th, as scattered bands, and not as a
whole.

The very size of the army was uncertain. On paper there were more than
twenty thousand men; as a matter of fact there can seldom have been more
than four-fifths of that number. Of the actual total Massachusetts
provided 11,500, Connecticut 2300, New Hampshire 1200, Rhode Island
1000.[85] Further, in its variable size this was the very type of a
volunteer army, of which every man owned his equipment, clothed himself,
and considered himself still, to a large extent, his own master. Of the
thousands living within twenty-five miles of Boston, who sprang to arms
on the 19th, knowing that if they were quick they might strike the
British before night, few had the foresight to prepare themselves
properly for the campaign that was to follow. There were no commissary
stores to s