yond the exit from either
peninsula the next hill was already fortified, and the Americans
prepared to "sell it at the same price."[128]

The British generals wrote very plainly in explaining the situation to
their superiors at home. To be sure, Gage was a trifle disingenuous in
reviewing the past. While admitting that the recent trials at arms
proved the rebels "not the despicable rabble too many have supposed them
to be," he ignored his original boast concerning lions and lambs. In
stating that in all previous wars the Americans had never showed so much
"conduct, attention, and perseverance," he admitted his ignorance of
colonial history. But Gage was endeavoring to salve his smart and
conceal his own shame.

Burgoyne, with nothing to palliate, wrote very frankly. "Look, my Lord,"
he said to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "upon the country
near Boston. It is all fortification." His mathematics has been already
quoted; he adds that the army had nothing for transport in an active
campaign of any duration. Proceeding, he delicately points out that Gage
was not the man for the situation, and laments again that the general
had no means of knowing what passed in the American councils, or even
within the American lines.

This is but another proof, if one were needed, of the poor use to which
Church had put his opportunities. Surely he, as Arnold later, sold his
soul to little purpose. Few things in this campaign are more honorable
to America than the fact that Washington's most precious secret, his
lack of powder, though known to many, never came to the ears of the
British generals. One may question if the truth, if told, would have
been believed, for men of Gage and Howe's training could scarcely
suppose a man capable of such daring and dogged obstinacy as to hold his
post before them without powder, or guns, or, as it finally turned out,
almost without men. But no statement has been made that the commanders
heard even rumors of Washington's difficulties.

After Bunker Hill, then, the British generals plainly saw that they
could never campaign successfully with Boston as a base. As to what
should best be done, Gage had no idea; Burgoyne, however, was ready with
a plan. He proposed to keep in Boston as small a garrison, supported by
as small a fleet, as could safely be left, and to send the rest of the
troops and ships to harry the coast. This proposition, if by the vague
term of chastisement he meant the burni