s in the town were arranged to accommodate the
troops, two of the churches being fitted up for this purpose. The tents
were struck, and the army made itself snug. Howe busied himself with
routine matters of the camp, and refused to budge. Though Washington
first fortified Cobble Hill in Somerville, the nearest he had yet come
to the British posts, and though after that he came a step nearer,
seizing Lechmere's Point, Howe simply fired from cannon, but made no
attempt to storm the works. The cannonading merely inured the Americans
to danger, and seeing that it did them good rather than harm, Howe
presently stopped it. Washington, perhaps not aware of the strength of
his own position, declared himself "unable, upon any principle
whatever," to account for Howe's inaction. He suspected it might be
intended to lull him into a false sense of security, but resolved to be
more vigilant than ever.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] This expression is ascribed to General Nathanael Greene.

[129] Fonblanque's "Burgoyne," 197-198.

[130] Leach's "Journal."

[131] William T. Miller, of Newport, R.I., to his wife Lydia. Mass.
Hist. and Gen. Register, 1855.

[132] Frothingham's "Siege," 230.

[133] _Ibid._, 279.

[134] This obscure diversion caused the Dorringtons to be suspected of
signalling at night to the rebels.

[135] Leach's and Edes' "Journals," N. E. Hist. and Gen. Register, 1865;
Newell's "Journal," Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections, i, series iv;
Frothingham's "Siege," 239; Sabine's "Loyalists."

[136] September 26.

[137] Instructions for Clinton's expedition to the southward.
Frothingham's "Siege," 292.

CHAPTER XIII

WASHINGTON'S DIFFICULTIES

The situation at Boston in the fall of 1775 presents an interesting
comparison: two generals of opposing armies, each ready to welcome an
attack, but each unable to deliver one. The difference between the two,
and the fact which determined the outcome, was in the natures of the two
men. Howe, from a certain sluggishness of disposition, was content to
sit tight, and wait until the government at home should send him his
relief. Though at each move his enemy came nearer, Howe still appeared
to believe that Dorchester was safe from seizure, and was content so to
believe. But Washington was not satisfied to be still. His nature urged
him to action, and though he knew himself too weak for an assault, he
constantly schemed and worked to put his army into condition to strike.

In s