mpelled the Government to recognize the
political existence of Spain; a French army was ordered out of Mexico
when it was felt to be a menace; the presence of immigrant Irish in large
numbers always gave a note of uncertainty to the national attitude
towards Great Britain. The export of cotton from the Southern States
created industrial relations of such importance with Great Britain that,
during the Civil War, after the establishment of the blockade on the
Confederate coast, wisdom and forbearance were needed on both sides to
prevent the breaking out of armed conflict. But during the last third of
the century, which was marked in this country by an extraordinary
industrial evolution and an increased interest in domestic
administrative issues, the attitude of the United States towards Europe,
except during the brief Venezuelan crisis and the war with Spain, was
generally characterized by the indifference which is the natural outcome
of geographical separation.

In diplomatic language American foreign policy, so far as Europe was
concerned, was based upon the principle of "non-intervention." The right
to manage their affairs in their own way without interference was conceded
to European Governments and a reciprocal attitude was expected of them.
The American Government followed strictly the purpose of not participating
in any political arrangements made between European states regarding
European issues. Early in the life of the nation Jefferson had correlated
the double aspect of this policy: "Our first and fundamental maxim," he
said, "should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our
second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."
The influence of John Quincy Adams crystallized this double policy in the
Monroe Doctrine, which, as compensation for denying to European states the
right to intervene in American politics, sacrificed the generous
sympathies of many Americans, among them President Monroe himself, with
the republican movements across the Atlantic. With the continued and
increasing importance of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of national
policy, the natural and reciprocal aspect of that doctrine, implying
political isolation from Europe, became more deeply imbedded in the
national consciousness.

There was, it is true, another aspect to American foreign policy besides
the European, namely, that concerning the Pacific and the Far East, which,
as diplomatic historia