n inch of
any essential parts of the programme for raising an army by conscription,"
and exercised his personal influence to its fullest extent in order to
secure a favorable vote. He was ably seconded by Julius Kahn, the ranking
Republican member of the House Military Committee, who was himself born in
Germany. The failure of House and Senate to agree on the matter of age
liability delayed action for some weeks. Finally, on May 18, 1917, what
is popularly known as the Selective Service Act became law.

This Act gave to the President power to raise the regular army by
enlistment to 287,000 men, to take into the Federal service all members
of the national guard, and to raise by selective draft, in two
installments, a force of a million troops. All men between the ages of
twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, were registered on the 5th of
June; this with the subsequent registration of men coming of age later,
produced an available body of more than ten millions. And when in the
following year, the draft age was extended to include all men between the
ages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive, thirteen millions more
were added. From this body the names of those who were to serve were
drawn by lot. All men registered were carefully classified, in order that
the first chosen might be those not merely best fitted for fighting, but
those whose absence on the firing line would least disturb the essential
economic life of the nation. Liberal exemptions were accorded, including
artisans employed in industries necessary to war production and men upon
whom others were dependent. On the 20th of July the first drawings were
made, and by the end of the year about half a million of the drafted men,
now called the National Army, were mustered in. In the meantime
enlistments in the regular army and the national guard had raised the
total number of troops to about a million and a quarter and of officers
to more than one hundred thousand. Less than a year later, when the
armistice was signed, the army included over three and a half millions,
of whom nearly two millions were in France.

The real military contribution of the United States to allied victory lay
in man-power. It could not of its own resources transport the troops nor
equip them completely, but the raising of an enormous number of fresh
forces, partially trained, it is true, but of excellent fighting caliber,
made possible the maneuvers of Foch that brought disaster to G