to their first allegiance.
Hughes did not prove a strong candidate. Whereas Wilson had stated his
position on the German-American problem plainly, "I neither seek the
favor nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us which
puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States,"
Hughes was ordered by his party managers not to offend foreign-born
voters, and in his attempt to steer a middle course, gave a clear
impression of vacillation. Many of those who had been most thoroughly
disgusted with Wilson turned back to him again, as the weeks passed and
Hughes more and more sought refuge in vague generalizations. In a
campaign in which the issues were largely personal the Republican
candidate's failure to evolve a constructive policy greatly weakened him,
especially as Wilson had the advantage of the maxim that it is best not
to change horses in the middle of the stream. Finally, Hughes did not
prove adept in reconciling the Progressives. Indeed it was said to be a
political _gaucherie_ on his part, or that of his advisers, which
alienated the friends of Governor Hiram Johnson of California and threw
the electoral vote of that State to Wilson.
California turned the scale. When on the evening of the 7th of November
the first returns came in and it was seen that Wilson had lost New York
and Illinois, the election of Hughes was generally conceded. Even the
_New York Times_ and the _World_ admitted Wilson's defeat. But the next
morning, news from the west indicated that the President still had a
chance. Later in the day the chance grew larger; he had won Ohio;
Minnesota and California were doubtful. In both States voting was close;
if Wilson won either the election would be his. It was not until the 11th
of November that the returns from California definitely showed a small
Wilson plurality, and only on the 21st that the Republicans finally
abandoned hope. Wilson had secured 277 electoral votes to 254 for
Hughes. He had been saved by the pacifist Middle and Far West, in
combination with the South. But the victory meant something far different
from peace at any price.
CHAPTER V
AMERICA DECIDES
The presidential campaign of 1916, taken in conjunction with the
increasing tension of European relations, forced Wilson to a further
development of his international ideals and a more definite formulation of
the means by which to attain them. As we have observed, the spring of that
year
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