harged with Tritheism upon this account, that he fences against
another charge of mixing and confounding the 'Hypostases' or Persons,
by denying any difference or diversity of nature, [Greek: hos ek tou
mae dechesthai taen kata physin diaphoran, mixin tina ton hypostaseon
kai anakuklaesin kataskeuzonta], which argues that he thought he had
so fully asserted the unity of the divine essence, that some might
suspect he had left but one Person, as well as one nature in God.

This is just what I have said, p. 116. Whether Sabellianism or
Tritheism, I observed is hard to determine. Extremes meet.

Ib. p. 121.

Secondly, to this 'homo-ousiotes' the Fathers added a numerical unity
of the divine essence. This Petavius has proved at large by numerous
testimonies, even from those very Fathers, whom he before accused for
making God only collectively one, as three men are one man; such as
Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyril, Maximus, Damascen; which is a
demonstration, that however 'he might mistake' their explication of
it, from the unity of human nature, they were far enough from
Tritheism, or one collective God.

This is most uncandid. Sherlock, even to be consistent with his own
confession, Sec. 1. p. 120, ought to have said, "However he might mistake
their 'intention', in consequence of their inconvenient and
unphilosophical explication;" which mistake, in fact, consisted in
taking them at their word.

Ib.

Petavius greatly commends Boethius's explication of this mystery,
which is the very same he had before condemned in Gregory Nyssen, and
those other Fathers.--That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God,
not three Gods: 'hujus conjunctionis ratio est indifferentia': that
is, such a sameness of nature as admits of no difference or variety,
or an exact 'homo-ousiotes', as he explains it. * * Those make a
difference, who augment and diminish, as the Arians do; who
distinguish the Trinity into different natures, as well as Persons, of
different worth and excellency, and thus divide and multiply the
Trinity into a plurality of Gods. 'Principium enim pluralitatis
alteritas est. Praeter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit
intelligi potest'.

Then if so, what becomes of the Persons? Have the Persons attributes
distinct from their nature;--or does not their common nature constitute
their common attributes? 'Principium enim, &c.'

Ib. p. 124.

That the Fathers universa