re, evil is in reality a lesser
good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
greater evil in the future.[15]

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This
Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.

Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions
whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
disposition and manner of life it will be well