the power of man, but by the power of things external to
us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be
either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
life, are alone called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
rational l