e same sort.

PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is
referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from
reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.

PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.

Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
the single contemplatio