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of the body, which is explained
through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.
Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should
remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
terms of time, or have any relation to time. But,
notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the
mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the
mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to
endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far
only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more
do we understand God.
Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.
PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXVI. In propo
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