not be excessive. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
of a thing future, past, or present.

Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be
present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.

Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
it were present the good which it conceived as future;
consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we
can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence
such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf.
IV. xvi.)

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
active, or in other words to reason