uals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For
we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as
we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end,
infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope
of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for
him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
deaf, it is neither good nor bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more
perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially
remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean that he is
changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed in