is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say
that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what
has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
also III. xiii. note).

VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens
that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
readily degenerates into simple love.

XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
hate.

Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that
which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
the issue.

XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain