the possibility of something happening to prevent the
realization of his projects. It is an imprudent confidence to trust that
fortune will be on our side. The wise man considers both sides: he knows
how great is the power of errors, how uncertain human affairs are, how
many obstacles there are to the success of plans. Without committing
himself, he awaits the doubtful and capricious issue of events, and
weighs certainty of purpose against uncertainty of result. Here also,
however, he is protected by that saving clause, without which he decides
upon nothing, and begins nothing.

XXXV. When I promise to bestow a benefit, I promise it, unless something
occurs which makes it my duty not to do so. What if, for example, my
country orders me to give to her what I had promised to my friend? or if
a law be passed forbidding any one to do what I had promised to do for
him? Suppose that I have promised you my daughter in marriage, that
then you turn out to be a foreigner, and that I have no right of
intermarriage with foreigners; in this case, the law, by which I
am forbidden to fulfil my promise, forms my defence. I shall be
treacherous, and hear myself blamed for inconsistency, only if I do not
fulfil, my promise when all conditions remain the same as when I made
it; otherwise, any change makes me free to reconsider the entire case,
and absolves me from my promise. I may have promised to plead a cause;
afterwards it appears that this cause is designed to form a precedent
for an attack upon my father. I may have promised to leave my country,
and travel abroad; then news comes that the road is beset with robbers.
I was going to an appointment at some particular place; but my son's
illness, or my wife's confinement, prevented me. All conditions must be
the same as they were when I made the promise, if you mean to hold me
bound in honour to fulfil it. Now what greater change can take place
than that I should discover you to be a bad and ungrateful man? I
shall refuse to an unworthy man that which I had intended to give him
supposing him to be worthy, and I shall also have reason to be angry
with him for the trick which he has put upon me.

XXXVI. I shall nevertheless look into the matter, and consider what the
value of the thing promised may be. If it be trifling, I shall give it,
not because you are worthy of it, but because I promised it, and I shall
not give it as a present, but merely in order to make good my words
and give my