is possible, and the
possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since
it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is,
moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4,
'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in
sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.'
This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge
of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of
greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual
Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of
all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a
recognised Vedanta tenet.--There is another passage also warning men not
to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different
entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is
there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death
to death.'--The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration.
When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or
non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to
choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of
desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the
distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom
and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who
desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I,
2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise
who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is
difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the
individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if
Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for
himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked
a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.
Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the
question in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the
objection that the two questions differ in form. The sec