al passage
enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the
sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be
allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be
taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of
intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for
instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of
dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected
with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves
the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure
Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;
that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from
Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and
effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be
demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the
ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world
would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would
find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction
of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the
doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes
non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhya),
would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which is
intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also
which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana
of the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much
for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on
difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its
origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation
(without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as
sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of
an opposite nature,