tion is based on the
fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause
(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be
distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running
counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the
characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite
proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought
forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an
effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things
has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the
purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the
world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other
means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,
on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be
accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely
gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),
inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy
tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be
obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O
dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in
truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the
cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings
(i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.

There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do
not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'
'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions
of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in
every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X,
2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptur