than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to
Deussen's System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire
system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are
represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the
Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid
sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the
Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's
school. With regard to Ramanuja's philosophy our chief source was,
hitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the
short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the
/S/ri-bhashya itself.
What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as
follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one
universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This
being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or,
which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya,
j/n/ana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as
its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking
being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities;
whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of
it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the
appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in
which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer
runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which
the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called
'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called
'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the
appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the
undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world
comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this
principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of
the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of
animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the
material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the
circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that
the material cause of the world is Brahman
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