bhokta eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/taya
pratiyamano jiva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.]

[Footnote 11: Sthanadivyapade/s/a/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi
tish/th/ann ity adina pratipadyamana/m/ /k/akshushi
sthitiniyamanadika/m/ paramatmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tva
akshipurushasya paramatmatva/m/ sadhitam idani/m/ tad eva samarthayate
antaryau.]

[Footnote 12: Anandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; aka/s/a/h/ I, 1,
22; prana/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prana/h/ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2,
9; guha/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryami I, 2, 18;
ad/ris/yatvadigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vanara/h/ I, 2, 24;
dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1; bhuma I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3,
13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) aka/s/a/h/
I, 3,41.]

SECOND ADHYAYA.

The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously
teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose
nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage
which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more
especially the Sa@nkhya system. The task of the two first padas of the
second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against
the Vedanta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from
scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds,
that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedanta can be
satisfactorily established.

PADA I.

Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sa@nkhya objection that the acceptation of
the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the Sa@nkhya doctrine which
after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on
consideration.--To accept the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedantin replies,
would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
which are opposed to the Sa@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of
Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can
be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but
rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an
intelligent primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the
Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of
intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material
world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world
when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary expe