will give me an
army of 45,000 men, of which possibly I may send a part to Rome. If
you continue your confidence and approve these plans, I am sure of
success: Italy is yours." Somewhat later, the Directors proposed to
grant the required reinforcements, but stipulated for the retention of
part of the army in the Milanese _under the command of Kellermann_.
Thereupon Bonaparte replied (May 14th) that, as the Austrians had been
reinforced, it was highly impolitic to divide the command. Each
general had his own way of making war. Kellermann, having more
experience, would doubtless do it better: but both together would do
it very badly.
Again the Directors had blundered. In seeking to subject Bonaparte to
the same rules as had been imposed on all French generals since the
treason of Dumouriez in 1793, they were doubtless consulting the vital
interests of the Commonwealth. But, while striving to avert all
possibilities of Caesarism, they now sinned against that elementary
principle of strategy which requires unity of design in military
operations. Bonaparte's retort was unanswerable, and nothing more was
heard of the luckless proposal.
Meanwhile the peace with the House of Savoy had thrown open the
Milanese to Bonaparte's attack. Holding three Sardinian fortresses, he
had an excellent base of operations; for the lands restored to the
King of Sardinia were to remain subject to requisitions for the French
army until the general peace. The Austrians, on the other hand, were
weakened by the hostility of their Italian subjects, and, worst of
all, they depended ultimately on reinforcements drawn from beyond the
Alps by way of Mantua. In the rich plains of Lombardy they, however,
had one advantage which was denied to them among the rocks of the
Apennines. Their generals could display the tactical skill on which
they prided themselves, and their splendid cavalry had some chance of
emulating the former exploits of the Hungarian and Croatian horse.
They therefore awaited the onset of the French, little dismayed by
recent disasters, and animated by the belief that their antagonist,
unversed in regular warfare, would at once lose in the plains the
bubble reputation gained in ravines. But the country in the second
part of this campaign was not less favourable to Bonaparte's peculiar
gifts than that in which he had won his first laurels as commander.
Amidst the Apennines, where only small bodies of men could be moved, a
general inexp
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