siege of
Mantua), scattered along a front of fifty miles from Milan to Brescia
and Legnago, the incursion of Wuermser's force, if the French were held
to their separate positions by diversions against their flanks, must
have proved decisive. But the fault was committed of so far dividing
the Austrians that nowhere could they deal a crushing blow.
Quosdanovich with 17,600 men was to take the western side of Lake
Garda, seize the French magazines at Brescia, and cut their
communications with Milan and France: the main body under Wuermser,
24,300 strong, was meanwhile to march in two columns on either bank of
the Adige, drive the French from Rivoli and push on towards Mantua:
and yet a third division, led by Davidovich from the district of
Friuli on the east, received orders to march on Vicenza and Legnago,
in order to distract the French from that side, and possibly relieve
Mantua if the other two onsets failed.
Faulty as these dispositions were, they yet seriously disconcerted
Bonaparte. He was at Montechiaro, a village situated on the road
between Brescia and Mantua, when, on July 29th, he heard that the
white-coats had driven in Massena's vanguard above Rivoli on the
Adige, were menacing other positions near Verona and Legnago, and were
advancing on Brescia. As soon as the full extent of the peril was
manifest, he sent off ten despatches to his generals, ordering a
concentration of troops--these, of course, fighting so as to delay the
pursuit--towards the southern end of Lake Garda. This wise step
probably saved his isolated forces from disaster. It was at that point
that the Austrians proposed to unite their two chief columns and crush
the French detachments. But, by drawing in the divisions of Massena
and Augereau towards the Mincio, Bonaparte speedily assembled a
formidable array, and held the central position between the eastern
and western divisions of the Imperialists. He gave up the important
defensive line of the Adige, it is true; but by promptly rallying on
the Mincio, he occupied a base that was defended on the north by the
small fortress of Peschiera and the waters of Lake Garda. Holding the
bridges over the Mincio, he could strike at his assailants wherever
they should attack; above all, he still covered the siege of Mantua.
Such were his dispositions on July 29th and 30th. On the latter day he
heard of the loss of Brescia, and the consequent cutting of his
communications with Milan. Thereupon he promptl
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