he could make a
rush at Piacenza, cross the Po there, and thus gain the Milanese
almost without a blow. To this end he had stipulated in the recent
terms of peace that he might cross the Po at Valenza; and now, amusing
his foes by feints on that side, he vigorously pushed his main columns
along the southern bank of the Po, where they gathered up all the
available boats. The vanguard, led by the impetuous Lannes, seized the
ferry at Piacenza, before the Austrian horse appeared, and scattered a
squadron or two which strove to drive them back into the river (May
7th).

Time was thus gained for a considerable number of French to cross the
river in boats or by the ferry. Working under the eye of their leader,
the French conquered all obstacles: a bridge of boats soon spanned
the stream, and was defended by a _tete de pont_; and with forces
about equal in number to Liptay's Austrians, the republicans advanced
northwards, and, after a tough struggle, dislodged their foes from the
village of Fombio. This success drove a solid wedge between Liptay and
his commander-in-chief, who afterwards bitterly blamed him, first for
retreating, and secondly for not reporting his retreat to
headquarters.

It would appear, however, that Liptay had only 5,000 men (not the
8,000 which Napoleon and French historians have credited to him), that
he was sent by Beaulieu to Piacenza too late to prevent the crossing
by the French, and that at the close of the fight on the following day
he was completely cut off from communicating with his superior.
Beaulieu, with his main force, advanced on Fombio, stumbled on the
French, where he looked to find Liptay, and after a confused fight
succeeded in disengaging himself and withdrawing towards Lodi, where
the high-road leading to Mantua crossed the River Adda. To that stream
he directed his remaining forces to retire. He thereby left Milan
uncovered (except for the garrison which held the citadel), and
abandoned more than the half of Lombardy; but, from the military point
of view, his retreat to the Adda was thoroughly sound. Yet here again
a movement strategically correct was marred by tactical blunders. Had
he concentrated all his forces at the nearest point of the Adda which
the French could cross, namely Pizzighetone, he would have rendered
any flank march of theirs to the northward extremely hazardous; but he
had not yet sufficiently learned from his terrible teacher the need of
concentration; and, h