tween
Roverbella and Goito. Augereau further asserts that, after he had
roused Bonaparte to the need of a dash to recover Brescia, the
commander-in-chief remarked to Berthier, "In that case we must raise
the siege of Mantua," which again he (Augereau) vigorously opposed.
This second statement is creditable neither to Augereau's accuracy nor
to his sagacity. The order for the raising of the siege had been
issued, and it was entirely necessary for the concentration of French
troops, on which Bonaparte now relied as his only hope against
superior force. Had Bonaparte listened to Augereau's advice and
persisted still in besieging Mantua, the scattered French forces must
have been crushed in detail. Augereau's words are those of a mere
fighter, not of a strategist; and the timidity which he ungenerously
attributed to Bonaparte was nothing but the caution which a superior
intellect saw to be a necessary prelude to a victorious move.
That the fighting honours of the ensuing days rightly belong to
Augereau may be frankly conceded. With forces augmented by the
northern part of the besiegers of Mantua, he moved rapidly westwards
from the Mincio against Brescia, and rescued it from the vanguard of
Quosdanovich (August 1st). On the previous day other Austrian
detachments had also, after obstinate conflicts, been worsted near
Salo and Lonato. Still, the position was one of great perplexity: for
though Massena's division from the Adige was now beginning to come
into touch with Bonaparte's chief force, yet the fronts of Wuermser's
columns were menacing the French from that side, while the troops of
Quosdanovich, hovering about Lonato and Salo, struggled desperately to
stretch a guiding hand to their comrades on the Mincio.
Wuermser was now discovering his error. Lured towards Mantua by false
reports that the French were still covering the siege, he had marched
due south when he ought to have rushed to the rescue of his
hard-pressed lieutenant at Brescia. Entering Mantua, he enjoyed a
brief spell of triumph, and sent to the Emperor Francis the news of
the capture of 40 French cannon in the trenches, and of 139 more on
the banks of the Po. But, while he was indulging the fond hope that
the French were in full retreat from Italy, came the startling news
that they had checked Quosdanovich at Brescia and Salo. Realizing his
errors, and determining to retrieve them before all was lost, he at
once pushed on his vanguard towards Castiglio
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