his confidence in the strength of his own right wing betrayed him
into a fatal imprudence. Sending out feelers after his hard-pressed
colleague on the north, he dangerously prolonged his line, an error in
which he was deftly encouraged by Bonaparte, who held back his own
left wing. Meanwhile the French were rolling in the other extremity of
the Austrian line. Marmont, dashing forward with the horse artillery,
took the enemy's left wing in flank and silenced many of their pieces.
Under cover of this attack, Fiorella's division was able to creep up
within striking distance; and the French cavalry, swooping round the
rear of this hard-pressed wing, nearly captured Wuermser and his staff.
A vigorous counterattack by the Austrian reserves, or an immediate
wheeling round of the whole line, was needed to repulse this brilliant
flank attack; but the Austrian reserves had been expended in the north
of their line; and an attempt to change front, always a difficult
operation, was crushed by a headlong charge of Massena's and
Augereau's divisions on their centre. Before these attacks the whole
Austrian line gave way; and, according to Colonel Graham, nothing but
this retreat, undertaken "without orders," saved the whole force from
being cut off. The criticisms of our officer sufficiently reveal the
cause of the disaster. The softness and incapacity of Wuermser, the
absence of a responsible second in command, the ignorance of the
number and positions of the French, the determination to advance
towards Castiglione and to wait thereabouts for Quosdanovich until a
battle could be fought with combined forces on the 7th, the taking up
a position almost by haphazard on the Castiglione-Medole line, and the
failure to detect Fiorella's approach, present a series of defects and
blunders which might have given away the victory to a third-rate
opponent.[61]

The battle was by no means sanguinary: it was a series of manoeuvres
rather than of prolonged conflicts. Hence its interest to all who by
preference dwell on the intellectual problems of warfare rather than
on the details of fighting. Bonaparte had previously shown that he
could deal blows with telling effect. The ease and grace of his moves
at the second battle of Castiglione now redeemed the reputation which
his uncertain behaviour on the four preceding days had somewhat
compromised.

A complete and authentic account of this week of confused fighting has
never been written. The archive