allies was dictated more by political jealousy
than by military motives. To these political affairs we must now
allude; for they had no small effect in leading Napoleon on to an
illusory triumph and an irretrievable overthrow. We will show their
influence, first on the conduct of the allies, and then on the actions
of Napoleon.

The alarm of Austria at the growing power of Russia and Prussia was
becoming acute. She had drawn the sword only because Napoleon's
resentment was more to be feared than Alexander's ambition. But all
had changed since then. The warrior who, five months ago, still had
his sword at the throat of Germany, was now being pursued across the
dreary flats of Champagne. And his eastern rival, who then plaintively
sued for Austria's aid, now showed a desire to establish Russian
control over all the Polish lands, indemnifying Prussia for losses in
that quarter by the acquisition of Saxony. Both of these changes would
press heavily on Austria from the north; and she was determined to
prevent them as far as possible. Then there was the vexed question of
the reconstruction of Germany to which we shall recur later on.
Smaller matters, involving the relations of the allies to Bernadotte,
Denmark, and Switzerland further complicated the situation: but, above
all, there was the problem of the future limits and form of government
of France.

On that topic there were two chief parties: those who desired merely
to clip Napoleon's wings, and those who sought to bring back France to
her old boundaries. The Emperor Francis was still disposed to leave
him the "natural frontiers," provided he gave up all control of
Germany, Holland, and Italy. On the other side were the Czar and the
forward wing of the Prussian patriots. Frederick William was more
cautious, but in the main he deferred to the Czar's views on the
boundary question. Still, so powerful was the influence of the Emperor
Francis, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg, that the two parties were
evenly balanced and beset by many suspicions and fears, until the
arrival of the British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, began to restore
something like confidence and concord.

The British Cabinet had decided that, as none of our three envoys then
at the allied headquarters had much diplomatic experience, our
Minister should go in person to supervise the course of affairs. He
reached head-quarters in the third week of January, and what Thiers
has called the proud simplicity