river, only the rearguard suffering heavily from the
belated attack of the allies. With the loss of 4,000 men, Napoleon
fell back northwards into the wasted plains of Sezanne. Hope now
vanished from every breast but his. And surely if human weakness had
ever found a place in that fiery soul, it might now have tempted him
to sue for peace. He had flung himself first north, then south, in
order to keep for France the natural frontiers that he might have had
as a present last November; he had failed; and now he might with
honour accept the terms of the victors. But once more he was too late.

The negotiations at Chatillon had ended on March 19th, that is, nine
days later than had been originally fixed by the allies. The extension
of time was due mainly to their regard and pity for Caulaincourt; and,
indeed, he was in the most pitiable position, a plenipotentiary
without full powers, a Minister kept partly in the dark by his
sovereign, and a patriot unable to rescue his beloved France from the
abyss towards which Napoleon's infatuation was hurrying her. He knew
the resolve of the allies far better than his master's intentions. It
was from Lord Aberdeen that he heard of the failure of the parleys for
an armistice: from him also he learnt that Napoleon had written a
"passionate" letter to Kaiser Francis, and he expressed satisfaction
that the reply was firm and decided.[430] His private intercourse at
Chatillon with the British plenipotentiaries was frank and friendly,
as also with Stadion. He received frequent letters from Metternich,
advising him quickly to come to terms with the allies;[431] and the
Austrian Minister sent Prince Esterhazy to warn him that the allies
would never recede from their demand of the old frontiers for France,
not even if the fortune of war drove them across the Rhine for a time.
"Is there, then, no means to enlighten Napoleon as to his true
situation, or to save him if he persists in destroying himself? Has he
irrevocably staked his own and his son's fate on the last
cannon?"--Let Napoleon, then, accept the allied proposal by sending a
counter-project, differing only very slightly from theirs, and peace
would be made.[432] Caulaincourt needed no spur. "He works tooth and
nail for a peace," wrote Stewart, "as far as depends on him. He dreads
Bonaparte's successes even more than ours, lest they should make him
more impracticable."[433]

But, unfortunately, his latest and most urgent appeal to the E