etternich insisted that the peace Congress must be opened.
Caulaincourt had for several days been waiting near the allied
head-quarters; and, said the Austrian Minister, it would be a breach
of faith to put him off any longer now that Castlereagh had arrived.
Only when Austria threatened to withdraw from the Coalition did
Alexander concede this point, and then with a very bad grace; for the
resumption of the negotiations virtually tied him to the neighbourhood
of Chatillon-sur-Seine, the town fixed for the Congress, while Bluecher
was rapidly moving towards Paris with every prospect of snatching from
the imperial brow the coveted laurel of a triumphal entry.

To prevent this interference with his own pet plans, the susceptible
autocrat sent off from Bar-sur-Seine (February 7th) an order that
Bluecher was not to enter Paris, but must await the arrival of the
sovereigns. The order was needless. Napoleon, goaded to fury by the
demands which the allies on that very day formulated at Chatillon,
flung himself upon Bluecher and completely altered the whole military
situation. But before describing this wonderful effort, we must take a
glance at the diplomatic overtures which spurred him on.

The Congress of Chatillon opened on February 5th, and on that day
Castlereagh gained his point, that questions about our maritime code
should be completely banished from the discussions. Two days later the
allies declared that France must withdraw within the boundaries of
1791, with the exception of certain changes made for mutual
convenience and of some colonial retrocessions that England would
grant to France. The French plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, heard this
demand with a quiet but strained composure: he reminded them that at
Frankfurt they had proposed to leave France the Rhine and the Alps; he
inquired what colonial sacrifices England was prepared to make if she
cooped up France in her old limits in Europe. To this our
plenipotentiaries Aberdeen, Cathcart, and Stewart refused to reply
until he assented to the present demand of the allies. He very
properly refused to do this; and, despite his eagerness to come to an
arrangement and end the misfortunes of France, referred the matter to
his master.[409]

What were Napoleon's views on these questions? It is difficult to
follow the workings of his mind before the time when Caulaincourt's
despatch flashed the horrible truth upon him that he might, after all,
leave France smaller and w