came as the act of the
French nation.[406] And this was a proviso on which our Government and
Wellington already laid great stress.

Castlereagh's straightforward behaviour had an immense influence in
leading Metternich to favour a more drastic solution of the French
question than he had previously advocated. The Frankfurt proposals
were now quietly waived, and Metternich came to see the need of
withdrawing Belgium from France and intrusting it to the House of
Orange. Still, the Austrian statesman was for concluding peace with
Napoleon as soon as might be, though he confessed in his private
letters that peace did not depend on the Chatillon parleys. Some
persons, he wrote, wanted the Bourbons back: still more wished for a
Regency (_i.e._, Marie Louise as Regent for Napoleon II.): others
said: "Away with Napoleon, no peace is possible with him": the masses
cried out for peace, so as to end the whole affair: but added
Metternich: "The riddle will be solved before or in Paris."[407] There
spoke the discreet opportunist, always open to the logic of facts and
the persuasion of Castlereagh.

Our Minister found the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia far less
tractable; and he only partially succeeded in lulling their suspicions
that Metternich was hand and glove with Napoleon. So deep was the
Czar's distrust of the Austrian statesman and commander-in-chief that
he resolved to brush aside Metternich's diplomatic _pourparlers_, to
push on rapidly to Paris, and there dictate peace.[408]

But it was just this eagerness of the Czar and the Prussians to reach
Paris which kept alive Austrian fears. A complete triumph to their
arms would seal the doom of Poland and Saxony; and it has been thought
that Schwarzenberg, who himself longed for peace, not only sought to
save Austrian soldiers by keeping them back, but that at this time he
did less than his duty in keeping touch with Bluecher. Several times
during the ensuing days the charge of treachery was hurled by the
Prussians against the Austrians, and once at least by Frederick
William himself. But it seems more probable that Metternich and
Schwarzenberg held their men back merely for prudential motives until
the resumption of the negotiations with France should throw more light
on the tangled political jungle through which the allies were groping.
It is significant that while Schwarzenberg cautiously felt about for
Napoleon's rearguard, of which he lost touch for two whole days,
M