e. On hearing of Metternich's Frankfurt offer to the French
Emperor, he wrote in his diary: "Propositions of peace without my
assent--Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees: a mad business."[390]

Frederick William's views were less pronounced: in fact, his proneness
to see a lion in every path earned for him the _sobriquet_ of
Cassandra in his Chancellor's diary. But in the main he was swayed by
the Czar; and that autocrat was now determined to dictate at Paris a
peace that would rid him of all prospect of his great rival's revenge.
Vanity and fear alike prescribed such a course of action. He longed to
lead his magnificent Guards to Paris, there to display his clemency in
contrast to the action of the French at Moscow; and this sentiment was
fed by fear of Napoleon. The latter motive was concealed, of course,
but Lord Aberdeen gauged its power during a private interview that he
had with Alexander at Freiburg (December 24th): "He talked with great
freedom: he is more decided than ever as to the necessity of
perseverance, and puts little trust in the fair promises of
Bonaparte.--'_So long as he lives there can be no security_'--he
repeated it two or three times."[391] We can therefore understand his
concern lest the Frankfurt terms should be accepted outright by
Napoleon. Metternich, however, assured him that the French Emperor
would not assent;[392] and, as in regard to the Prague Congress, he
was substantially correct.

Here again we touch on the disputed question whether Metternich played
a fair game against Napoleon, or whether he tempted him to play with
loaded dice while his throne was at stake. The latter supposition for
a long time held the field; but it is untenable. On several occasions
the Austrian statesman warned Napoleon, or his trusty advisers, that
the best course open to him was to sign peace at once. He did so at
Dresden, and he did so now. On November 10th he sent Caulaincourt a
letter, of which these are the most important sentences:

" ... M. de St. Aignan will speak to you of my conversations [with
him]. I expect nothing from them, but I shall have done my duty.
France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which the
Powers will make to-day, and tomorrow if they have reverses. New
successes may extend their views.... I do not doubt that the
approach of the allied armies to the frontiers of France may
facilitate the formation of great armaments by her Government. The
quest