n and brought no peaceful
overtures, but rather a tightening of Napoleon's coils in Saxony,
Bavaria, and Illyria, the Emperor Francis inclined towards war. As
late as July 18th he wrote to Metternich that he was still for peace,
provided that Illyria could be gained.[338]

But the French military preparations decided him, a few days later, to
make war, unless every one of the Austrian demands should be conceded
by August 10th. His counsellors had already come to that conclusion,
as our records prove. On July 20th Stadion wrote to Cathcart urging
him to give pecuniary aid to General Nugent, who would wait on him to
concert means for rousing a revolt against Napoleon in Tyrol and North
Italy; and our envoy agreed to give L5,000 a month for the "support of
5,000 Austrians acting in communication with our squadron in the
Adriatic." This step met with Metternich's approval; and, when writing
to Stadion from Prague (July 25th), he counselled Cathcart to send a
despatch to Wellington and urge him to make a vigorous move against
the south of France. He (Metternich) would have the letter sent safely
through Switzerland and the south of France direct to our
general.[339]

With the solemn triflings of the Congress we need not concern
ourselves. The French plenipotentiaries saw clearly that their master
"would allow of no peace but that which he should himself dictate with
his foot on the enemy's neck." Yet they persevered in their thankless
task, for "who could tell whether the Emperor, when he found himself
placed between highly favourable conditions and the fear of having
200,000 additional troops against him, might not hesitate; whether
just one grain of common sense, one spark of wisdom, might not enter
his head?" Alas! That brain was now impervious to advice; and the
young De Broglie, from whom we quote this extract, sums up the opinion
of the French plenipotentiaries in the trenchant phrase, "the devil
was in him."[340]

But there was method in his madness. In the Dresden interview he had
warned Metternich that not till the eleventh hour would he disclose
his real demands. And now was the opportunity of trying the effect of
a final act of intimidation. On August 4th he was back again in
Dresden: on the next day he dictated the secret conditions on which he
would accept Austria's mediation; and, on August 6th, Caulaincourt
paid Metternich a private visit to find out what Austria's terms
really were. After a flying visit t