idiculous nature of her pretensions.
I have wished to write you this letter so that you may thoroughly
know my thoughts once for all."

And to Maret, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, he wrote on the same
day:

"We must gain time, and to gain time without displeasing Austria,
we must use the same language we have used for the last six
months--that we can do everything if Austria is our ally.... Work
on this, beat about the bush, and gain time.... You can embroider
on this canvas for the next two months, and find matter for
sending twenty couriers."[301]

In such cases, where Napoleon's diplomatic assurances are belied by
his secret military instructions, no one who has carefully studied his
career can doubt which course would be adopted. The armistice was
merely the pause that would be followed by a fiercer onset, unless the
allies and Austria bent before his will. Of this they gave no sign
even after the blow of Bautzen. In the negotiations concerning the
armistice they showed no timidity; and when, on June 4th, it was
signed at Poischwitz up to July 20th, Napoleon felt some doubts
whether he had not shown too much complaisance.

It was so: in granting a suspension of arms he had signed his own
death warrant.

The news that reached him at Dresden in the month of June helped to
stiffen his resolve once more. Davoust and Vandamme had succeeded in
dispersing the raw levies of North Germany and in restoring Napoleon's
authority at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser; and in this they now
had the help of the Danes.

For some time the allies had been seeking to win over Denmark. But
there was one insurmountable barrier in the way, the ambition of
Bernadotte. As we have seen, he was desirous of signalizing his
prospective succession to the Swedish throne by bringing to his
adopted country a land that would amply recompense it for the loss of
Finland.[302] This could only be found in Norway, then united with
Denmark; and this was the price of Swedish succour, to which the Czar
had assented during the war of 1812. For reasons which need not be
detailed here, Swedish help was not then forthcoming. But early in
1813 it was seen that a diversion caused by the landing of 30,000
Swedes in North Germany might be most valuable, and it was especially
desired by the British Government. Still, England was loth to gain the
alliance of Bernadotte at the price of Norway, which must drive
Denmark into th