There two disappointments awaited them. The fortifications, dismantled
by the French in 1807, were still in disrepair, and the 20,000 muskets
bought in Austria for the Silesian levies were without touch-holes!
Again Barclay declared that he must retreat into Poland, and only the
offer of a truce by Napoleon deterred him from that step, which must
have compromised the whole military and political situation. What
would not Napoleon have given to know the actual state of things at
the allied headquarters?[300] But no spy warned him of the truth; and
as his own instincts prompted him to turn aside, so as to prepare
condign chastisement for Austria, he continued to treat for an
armistice.

"Nothing," he wrote to Eugene on June 2nd, "can be more perfidious
than that Court. If I granted her present demands, she would
afterwards ask for Italy and Germany. Certainly she shall have nothing
from me." Events served to strengthen his resolve. The French entered
Breslau in triumph, and raised the siege of Glogau. The coalition
seemed to be tottering. That the punishment dealt to the allies and
Austria might be severe and final, he only needed a few weeks for the
reorganization of his once formidable cavalry. Then he could vent his
rage upon Austria. Then he could overthrow the Hungarian horse, and
crumple up the ill-trained Austrian foot. A short truce, he believed,
was useless: it would favour the allies more than the French. And,
under the specious plea that the discussion of a satisfactory peace
must take up at least forty days, he ordered his envoy, Caulaincourt,
to insist on a space of time which would admit of the French forces
being fully equipped in Saxony, Bavaria, and Illyria. "If," he wrote
to Caulaincourt on June 4th, "we did not wish to treat with a view to
peace, we should not be so stupid as to treat for an armistice at the
present time." And he urged him to insist on the limit of July 20th,
"always on the same reasoning, namely, that we must have forty full
days to see if we can come to an understanding." Far different was his
secret warning to General Clarke, the Minister of War. To him he wrote
on June 2nd:

"If I can, I will wait for the month of September to deal great
blows. I wish then to be in a position to crush my enemies, though
it is possible that, when Austria sees me about to do so, she may
make use of her pathetic and sentimental style, in order to
recognize the chimerical and r