hern army on almost equal terms. In the east,
Suchet held his own against the Spaniards and an Anglo-Sicilian
expedition. But in regard to the rest of Spain, Soult's gloomy
prophecy was fulfilled: "The loss of Andalusia and the raising of the
siege of Cadiz are events whose results will be felt throughout the
whole of Europe."

The Spanish Cortes, or Parliament, long cooped up in Cadiz, now sought
to put in force the recently devised democratic constitution. It was
hailed with joy by advanced thinkers in the cities, and with loathing
by the clergy, the nobles, the wealthy, and the peasants. But, though
the Cortes sowed the seeds of political discord, they took one very
commendable step. They appointed Wellington generalissimo of all the
Spanish armies; and, in a visit which he paid to the Cortes at
Christmastide, he prepared for a real co-operation of Spanish forces
in the next campaign.

At that time Napoleon was uneasily looking into the state of Spanish
affairs. As soon as he mastered the contents of the despatches from
Madrid he counselled a course of action that promised, at any rate, to
postpone the overthrow of his power. The advice is set forth in
letters written on January 4th and February 12th by the Minister of
War, General Clarke; for Napoleon had practically ceased to correspond
with his brother. In the latter of these despatches Clarke explained
in some detail the urgent need of acting at once, while the English
were inactive, so as to stamp out the ever-spreading flame of revolt
in the northern provinces. Two French armies, that of the North and
the so-called "Army of Portugal," were to be told off for this duty;
and Joseph was informed that his armies of the south and of the centre
would for the present suffice to hold the British in check. As to
Joseph's general course of action, it was thus prescribed:

"The Emperor commands me to reiterate to your Majesty that the use
of Valladolid as a residence and as headquarters is an
indispensable preliminary. From that place must be sent out on the
Burgos road, and on other fit points, the troops which are to
strengthen or to second the army of the north. Madrid, and even
Valencia, form parts of this system only as posts to be held by
your extreme left, not as places to be kept by a concentration of
forces.... To occupy Valladolid and Salamanca, to use the utmost
exertion to pacify Navarre and Arragon to keep the communicat