deaf. His instincts and his
experience of the Kings prevented him yielding on any important point.
He determined to carry on the war from the Tagus to the Vistula, to
bolster up Joseph in Spain, to keep his garrisons fast rooted in every
fortress as far east as Danzig. Russia and Prussia, he said, had more
need of peace than France. If he began by giving up towns, they would
demand kingdoms, whereas by yielding nothing he would intimidate them.
And if they did form a league, their forces would be thinly spread out
over an immense space; he would easily dispose of their armies when
they were not aided by the climate; and a single victory would undo
the clumsy knot (_ce noeud mal assorti_).[282]

In truth, if he left Spain out of his count, the survey of the
military position was in many ways reassuring. England's power was
enfeebled by the declaration of war by the United States. In Central
Europe his position was still commanding. He held nearly all the
fortresses of Prussia, and though he had lost a great army, that loss
was spread out very largely over Poles, Germans, Italians, and smaller
peoples. Many of the best French troops and all his ablest generals
had survived. His Guard could therefore be formed again, and the
brains of his army were also intact. The war had brought to light no
military genius among the Russians; and all his past experience of the
"old coalition machines" warranted the belief that their rusty
cogwheels, even if oiled by English subsidies, would clank slowly
along and break down at the first exceptional strain. Such had been
the case at Marengo, at Austerlitz, at Friedland. Why should not
history repeat itself?

While he was guiding his steps solely by the light of past experience,
events were occurring that heralded the dawn of a new era for Central
Europe. On the 30th of December, the Prussian General Yorck, who led
the Prussian corps serving previously under Macdonald in Courland,
concluded the Convention of Tauroggen with the Russians, stipulating
that this corps should hold the district around Memel and Tilsit as
neutral territory, until Frederick William's decision should be known.
Strictly considered, this convention was a grave breach of
international law and an act of treachery towards Napoleon. The King
at first viewed it in that light; but to all his subjects it seemed a
noble and patriotic action. To continue the war with Russia for the
benefit of Napoleon would have been an ac