as rowed in for the
island.
We landed where the natives directed us, and soon after I was
introduced to Opoony, in the midst of a great concourse of people.
Having no time to lose, as soon as the necessary formality of
compliments was over, I asked the chief to give me the anchor, and
produced the present I had prepared for him, consisting of a linen
night-gown, a shirt, some gauze handkerchiefs, a looking-glass, some
beads and other toys, and six axes. At the sight of these last there
was a general outcry. I could only guess the cause, by Opoony's
absolutely refusing to receive my present till I should get the
anchor. He ordered three men to go and deliver it to me; and, as I
understood, I was to send by them what I thought proper in return.
With these messengers we set out in our boat for an island, lying at
the north side of the entrance into the harbour, where the anchor had
been deposited. I found it to be neither so large nor so perfect as I
expected. It had originally weighed seven hundred pounds, according
to the mark that was upon it; but the ring, with part of the shank and
two palms, were now wanting. I was no longer at a loss to guess the
reason of Opoony's refusing my present. He doubtless thought that it
so much exceeded the value of the anchor in its present state, that
I should be displeased when I saw it. Be this as it may, I took the
anchor as I found it, and sent him every article of the present that I
at first intended. Having thus completed my negociation, I returned on
board, and having hoisted in the boats, made sail from the island to
the north.[1]
[Footnote 1: Here again is a trait of genuine nobility, sufficient, we
have no doubt, to reinstate our commander in the good graces of every
reader. On the other hand, there is something so truly honest on
the part of Opoony and his people in declining the acceptance of the
present, till Cook had seen the article he was bargaining for, that
we cannot help giving them high credit for moral attainments. How
forcibly does such a conduct prove the existence of a sense of the
law, which says, "Do to others, as you would that others should do to
you." It is curious, that some authors have maintained, that no such
law is recognised among mankind till they are made acquainted with
divine revelation. But these persons have confounded together two
things, which are quite distinct,--a sense of the obligation of such a
law, and a disposition and power to obey
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