acedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect
it. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these
pretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen
by him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The
possession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the
courageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now
let Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.

Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes:
in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he
would consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works
to show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never
been able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had
the wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older
and richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have made
discoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not
been diametrically opposed.

Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the
younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He
earnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says,
how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he
has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often
submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from
Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to
his words.

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and
more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is
Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue
which is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches
thinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his
post.' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in
Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.
(2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military
courage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and
pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance.
But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and
injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But
then again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than
the intell