mind with him, and shall be delighted to be
interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having
to learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow
old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good
only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I
shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger,
or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is of no account with
me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and
confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which
I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever
since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof
of your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say
whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

SOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take
counsel and advise with me.

LYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours,
for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find
out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the
youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is
bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or
the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.
I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by
your selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your
conclusions.

SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of
Lysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves
the question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own
instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?' But
the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the
same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles.
For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other
thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must
know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily
attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my
meaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight
makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to
impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the natu