re of
sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best
and most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what
hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes
or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

LACHES: That is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment
inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted
to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

LACHES: Very true.

SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can
we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we
are wholly ignorant?

LACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of
virtue?

LACHES: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

LACHES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about
the whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let
us first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the
enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.

LACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we
not select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to
conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

LACHES: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the
nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the
young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits.
Tell me, if you can, what is courage.

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man
of courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights
against the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.

SOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express
myself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I
intended to ask, but another.

LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous
who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

LACHES: Certainly I should.

SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who
fights flying, instead of remaining?

LACHES: How flying?

SOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to