to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer,
because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war:
and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not
the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?
LACHES: Quite correct.
SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has
understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?
NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.
SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the
fearful and of the hopeful?
NICIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future
goods and future evils?
NICIAS: True.
SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the
future or at any time?
NICIAS: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other
sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of
the present and past, and of any time?
NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.
SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of
courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present
view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful,
but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to
time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?
NICIAS: I agree, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil,
and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be
perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance,
or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were
dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were
supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know
how to deal both with gods or men.
NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what
you say.
SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of
yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
NICIAS: It would seem so.
SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.
SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with ou
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