kind of consciousness; that is to say,
changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked
together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other.
When matters take the complex form of a living human brain, the
corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having
intelligence and volition." (Mind, January, 1878.)

[44] Theism, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the
University of Edinburgh, &c.

[45] Such being the objects in view, I have not thought it necessary to
extend this criticism into anything resembling a review of Professor
Flint's work as a whole; but, on the contrary, I have aimed rather at
confining my observations to those parts of his treatise which embody the
current arguments from teleology alone. I may here observe, however, in
general terms, that I consider all his arguments to have been answered by
anticipation in the foregoing examination of Theism. I may also here
observe, that throughout the following essay I have used the word "design"
in the sense in which it is used by Professor Flint himself. This sense is
distinctly a different one from that which the word bears in the writings
of the Paley, Bell, and Chalmers school. For while in the latter writings,
as pointed out in Chapter III., the word bears its natural meaning of a
certain _process of thought_, in Professor Flint's work it is used rather
as expressive of a _product of intelligence_. In other words, "design," as
used by Professor Flint, is synonymous with _intention_, irrespective of
the particular psychological process by which the intention may have been
put into effect.

[46] Op. cit., pp. 255-257.

[47] Let it be observed that there is a distinction between what I may call
substantial and formal existence. Thus there is no doubt that flowers as
flowers perish, or become non-existent; but the substances of which they
were composed persist. And, in this connection, I may here point out that
if the universe is infinite in space and time, the universe as a whole
would present substantial existence as standing out of relation to space
and time, whereas innumerable portions of the universe present only formal
existences, because standing in relation both to space and time. Thus, for
instance, the solar system, as a solar system, must have an end in time as
it has a boundary in space; but as the substance of which it consists will
not become extinguished by the