ation complete, the United States could neither destroy its
armies in the east nor open the Mississippi river. The National
Government could only escape annihilation by reaching the center of
the Confederate power and striking a fatal blow upon its resources.
Geographically, there was but one mode of attack by which this could
be accomplished, and this was unthought of or unknown to all connected
with the prosecution of the war.

Mr. Lincoln saw from the beginning the vital importance of regaining
the Mississippi and controlling the resources of its great valley, and
therefore reserved to himself the direction of this expedition as
Commander-in-chief. He was fully alive to the perils that now
environed the Government, and he and his advisers looked imploringly
to the army for relief as the agency absolutely essential to the
nation's life. This and this only could strike the blow that must then
be struck, if ever.

No display of military genius could have extorted from Lee his sword
so long as his resources were unwasted. No valor on the part of our
navies and armies could have opened the Mississippi so long as the
Confederates could keep open the lines of communication. The Memphis
and Charleston railroad was their only complete bond of connection
between their armies of the east and the armies of the Mississippi
Valley. There was but one avenue by which this bond could be reached
and effectually severed, and that was the Tennessee river. The people
had responded grandly; their uprising in behalf of their endangered
Government had astonished the world. It now remained for the army to
supplement by its valor in the field what the Administration and the
people had done at home.

Never was the stress and strain of a nation more severe; never when
another defeat would have been so perilous and a victory so desirable
as then. So long as the Confederates were undisturbed in the
possession of the southwest, and men and munitions of war sent
uninterruptedly to the east, the Army of the Potomac could not
advance. Something had to be done to cripple or engage the rebel
armies in that section.

As the weary months of October and November wore away, the darkness
grew more and more intense and the anxiety more oppressive. A blow had
to be inflicted quickly that would be sharp and mortal, to ward off
intervention and invasion by European powers, to smother the spirit of
secession in southern Illinois and Indiana, and to prevent