to go down the river for
the purpose of reducing Vicksburg, I have prepared the enclosed
map in order to demonstrate more clearly the obstacles to be
encountered in the contemplated assault. In the first place, it
is impossible to take Vicksburg in front without too great a loss
of life and material, for the reason that the river is only about
half a mile wide, and our forces would be in point-blank range of
their guns, not only from their water batteries, which line the
shore, but from the batteries that crown the hills, while the
enemy would be protected by the elevation from the range of our
fire. By examining the map I enclose you will at once perceive
why a place of so little apparent strength has been enabled to
resist the combined fleets of the upper and lower Mississippi.
The most economical plan for the reduction of Vicksburg now is to
push a column from Memphis to Corinth, down the Mississippi
Central railroad to Jackson, the capital of the State of
Mississippi. _The occupation of Jackson and the command of the
railroad to New Orleans would compel the immediate evacuation of
Vicksburg_, as well as the retreat of the entire rebel army east
of that line, and by another movement of our army from Jackson,
Mississippi, or from Corinth to Meridian, in the State of
Mississippi, on the Ohio and Mobile railroad, especially if aided
by a movement of our gunboats on Mobile, the Confederate forces,
with all the disloyal men and their slaves, would be compelled to
fly east of the Tombigbee. Mobile being then in our possession,
with 100,000 men at Meridian we would redeem the entire country
from Memphis to the Tombigbee river. Of course I would have the
gunboats with a small force at Vicksburg as auxiliary to this
movement. With regard to the canal, Vicksburg can be rendered
useless to the Confederate army upon the first rise of the river;
but I do not advise this, because Vicksburg belongs to the United
States and we desire to hold and fortify it, for the Mississippi
river at Vicksburg and the Vicksburg-Jackson railroad will become
necessary as a base of our future operations. Vicksburg might
have been reduced eight months ago, as I then advised, after the
fall of Fort Henry, and with much more ease than it can be done
to-day."

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