.*--In the
Hungarian constitutional system Parliament is in a very real sense
supreme. The king can exercise his prerogatives only through ministers
who are responsible to the lower chamber, and all arrangements
pertaining to the welfare of the state fall within the competence of
the legislative branch. Within Parliament it is the Chamber of
Deputies that preponderates. Aside from the king and ministry, it
alone enjoys the power of initiating legislation; and the opposition
with which the Chamber of Magnates may be disposed to meet its
measures invariably melts away after a show of opinion has been made.
By a simple majority vote in the lower chamber a minister may be
impeached for bribery, negligence, or any act detrimental to the
independence of the country, the constitution, individual liberty, or
property rights. Trial is held before a tribunal composed of men
chosen by secret ballot by the Chamber of Magnates from its own
members. For the purpose thirty-six members in all are required to be
elected. Of the number, twelve may be rejected by the impeachment
commission of the lower house, and twelve others by the minister or
ministers under impeachment. Those remaining, at least twelve in
number, try the case. Procedure is required to be public and the
penalty to be "fixed in proportion to the offense."[704]

[Footnote 704: Law III. of 1848 concerning the
Formation of a Responsible Hungarian Ministry, Secs.
33-34. Dodd, Modern Constitutions, I., 97.]

The statement which has sometimes been made that the parliamentary
system operates to-day in the kingdom of Hungary in a fuller measure
than in any other continental country requires qualification.
Nominally, it is true, an unfavorable vote in the Deputies upon a
Government measure or action involves the retirement of a minister, or
of the entire cabinet, unless the crown is willing to dissolve the
Chamber and appeal to the country; and no Government project of
consequence can be carried through without parliamentary approval.
Practical conditions within the kingdom, however, have never been
favorable for the operation of parliamentarism in a normal manner. In
the first place, the parliament itself is in no wise representative of
the nation as a whole. In the second place, the proceedings of the
body are not infrequently so stormy in character that for months at a
time the essential principles of parliamentarism