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o both defendants. When the clerk had entered the verdict, the jury were asked to attend to it, as it was about to be read by the clerk. The clerk then read the verdict in the hearing of the jury. The jury, upon being requested, if any of them disagreed to the verdict to make, it known by a nod, seemed to express their unanimous assent; and no juror expressed his dissent." In reviewing the case the Court say: "The error complained of is, that before the jury had announced their verdict, and in fact after they had intimated an intention to acquit the defendant, Shule, the Court allowed the clerk to be directed to enter a verdict finding him guilty, and after the verdict was so entered, allowed the jury to be asked if any of them disagreed to the verdict which had been recorded by the clerk. No juror expressed his dissent; but by a nod which appeared to be made by each juror, expressed their unanimous assent. The innovation is, that instead of permitting the jury to give their verdict, the Court allows a verdict to be entered for them, such as it is to be presumed the Court thinks they ought to render, and then they are asked if any of them disagree to it; thus making a verdict for them, unless they are bold enough to stand out against a plain intimation of the opinion of the Court." A _venire de novo_ was ordered. The principal difference between this case and the one under consideration is, that in the latter the Court directed the clerk to enter the verdict, and in the former he was allowed to do so, and in the latter the Court denied liberty to the jurors to dissent from the verdict, and in the former the Court allowed such dissent. With what jealous care the right of trial by jury in criminal cases has been guarded by every English speaking people from the days of King John, indeed from the days of King Alfred, is known to every lawyer and to every intelligent layman, and it does not seem to me that such a limitation of that right as is presented by the proceedings in this case, can be reconciled either with constitutional provisions, with the practice of courts, with public sentiment on the subject, or with safety in the administration of justice. How the question would be regarded by the highest Court of this State may fairly be gathered from its decision in the case of _Cancemi, 18 N.Y., 128_, where, on a trial for murder, one juror, some time after the trial commenced, being necessarily withdrawn, a stipulation
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