on him to show cause why he
should not be disfranchised; and they accordingly made the order.
This was undoubtedly irregular, but it was nothing more than a
mistake, and there was no ground to impute any malicious motives to
the persons making the order."

Lawrence, J., said:
"There is no instance of an action of this sort maintained for an
act merely from error of judgment. Perhaps the action might have
been maintained, if it had been proved that the defendants'
contriving and intending to injure and prejudice the plaintiff, and
to deprive him of the benefit of his profits from the fishery,
which as a member of this body he was entitled to, according to the
custom, had _wilfully and maliciously_ procured him to be
disfranchised, in consequence of which he was deprived of such
profits. But here there was no evidence of any wilful and malicious
intention to deprive the plaintiff of his profits, or that they had
disfranchised him with that intent, _which is necessary to maintain
this action_. They were indeed guilty of an error in their
proceedings to disfranchise him, in not going into any proof of the
offence charged against him, but taking his silence as a
confession. In the case of _Drewe v. Coulton_, where the action was
against the Mayor of Saltash, who was returning officer, for
refusing the plaintiff's vote at an election, which was claimed in
right of a burgage tenement; Wilson, J., nonsuited the plaintiff
_because malice was not proved_; and he observed, that though Lord
Holt, in the case of _Ashby v. White_, endeavored to show that the
action lay for the obstruction of the right, yet the House of
Lords, in the justification of their conduct, supposed to be
written by the Chief Justice, puts it upon a different principle,
the _wilfulness of the act_. The declaration in that case was
copied from the precedent in _Milward v. Sargeant_, which came on
in this court on a writ of error, _Hill 26, Geo. 3_, for refusing
the plaintiff's vote for the borough of Hastings. There the charge
was 'that the defendant contriving and wrongfully intending to
injure and prejudice the plaintiff, and to hinder and deprive him
of his privilege of voting, did not take or allow his vote.' All
which allegations Mr. Justice Wilson, in the case above alluded to,