nuous opposition, soon found himself well in Lee's
rear, but without support. He sent back aide after aide to hurry forward
the supporting lines, but without avail, finally galloping back himself.
He found General Birney resting near the bridge with his division. An
eye-witness[E] to Meade's interview with Birney says the language of
General Meade as he upbraided Birney for not coming to his support was
enough to "almost make the stones creep;" that Meade was almost wild
with rage as he saw the golden opportunity slipping away and the
slaughter of his men going for naught. He said Birney responded that he
agreed with General Meade fully, and was ready and most anxious to come
to his support, but that his orders were peremptory to await further
orders in his present position: that he had been for an hour trying to
find General Franklin to obtain permission to move forward. This loss of
time and want of support to Meade's charge changed a possible victory
into a fearful disaster. This was substantially the testimony of
Major-General Reynolds, commanding the First Corps, before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War. Burnside rode down to the left and vigorously
expostulated with Franklin for his failure to carry out his orders, and
peremptorily ordered him to make the attack as originally directed,
whilst he repeated the movement at the right. It was now considerably
after noon, and this order was undoubtedly a mistake. The plan of battle
had been revealed, and there was practically no hope of success. Had the
left grand division vigorously performed its part in the earlier
movement, can any one doubt the result? I cannot think so. Had Meade,
Reynolds, or Hancock been in command on the left that day, I feel
confident that Fredericksburg would have been recorded a glorious
victory instead of a horrible slaughter.

Now, why did the left grand division fail to make the attack as ordered?
Halleck, in his report on the operations at Fredericksburg, says
"alleged misunderstanding of orders." Here is his language:

"It was intended that Franklin's grand division, consisting of the corps
of Reynolds (First) and Smith (Sixth), should attack the enemy's right
and turn his position on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg,
while Sumner and Hooker attacked him in front. But by some alleged
misunderstanding of orders Franklin's operations were limited to a mere
reconnoissance, and the direct attacks of Sumner and Hooker were
uns