he army was divided into three grand
divisions, composed of two army corps each, namely, the Second and
Ninth, the right grand division, commanded by Sumner; the First and
Sixth, the left grand division, commanded by Franklin, and the Third
and Fifth, the centre, commanded by Hooker. The plan of battle was to
hold Lee's army at Fredericksburg by a "feint in force" (which means an
attack sufficiently strong to deceive the enemy into the belief that it
is the real or main attack) at that point, whilst the left grand
division was to throw a pontoon bridge across the river three miles
below and turn his flank (_i.e._, get behind them) in the rear of
Marye's Heights. For this purpose the left grand division was to advance
and attack vigorously. If successful, Lee would then have been between
Franklin's forces on the left and our own on the right, with every
possibility of being crushed. Hooker was to hold his division in
readiness to support either wing. Had this plan been carried out, our
work at the right would, at its conception, have been as it appeared to
be, a mad sacrifice of men, but with an opportunity later on of pushing
forward and reaping a victory. In that event, our position would have
made us a tremendous factor in the result.

Now how was the plan carried out? The student will be puzzled on finding
such a paucity of records concerning this disastrous movement. The
official documents are remarkable for what they do not contain. A study
of Covode's reports on the conduct of the war will, I think, justify my
conclusions, viz., that the disaster of Fredericksburg was due not to
accident, nor to a faulty plan of battle, but to a failure of the left
grand division to perform the vital part assigned to it. My information
gained at the time was that Franklin was to remain concealed until the
signal for our attack came; then he was to cross over and attack
vigorously, a military expression, meaning to put all possible vigor
and power into the movement. The signal was given as our attack began.
Whatever force may have crossed the river at that time, my information
was that the division known as the Pennsylvania Reserve, now numbering
probably not more than six thousand men, under General Meade, was the
only body of troops which made a determined attack on Lee's right, in
support of our work in front of Marye's Heights. Realizing the
opportunity, General Meade pushed forward with his usual vigor and,
though meeting stre